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Criminal Securities Fraud and the Lower
Materiality Standard
By Wendy Gerwick Couture1
I. Introduction

Securities fraud has been a federal crime since the enactment of the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act,
and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder, prohibit securities fraud,1
and § 32(a) of the 1934 Act criminalizes the willful violation of "any
provision of this chapter, or any rule or regulation thereunder,"2
including § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
In 2002, in the wake of the collapses of WorldCom and Enron,
Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.3 Section 807 of the Act,
codified in 18 U.S.C. § 1348, created a new crime called "Securities
fraud." Section 1348 defines this crime as follows:
Whoever knowingly executes, or attempts to execute, a scheme or arti
fice—
(1) to defraud any person in connection with . . . any security of [a
reporting]4 issuer . . .; or
(2) to obtain, by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representa
tions, or promises, any money or property in connection with the
purchase or sale of . . . any security of [a reporting] issuer; shall be
fined under this title, or imprisoned not more than 25 years, or both.

Section 1348 was slow to catch on. According to the Bureau of
Justice Statistics, only 45 defendants were charged with violating
S1348 from 2002 through 2010.5 By contrast, during this same period,
3 defendants were charged with violating § 10(b).6
Recently, however, several courts have interpreted § 1348 s e e
ments as diverging from § 10(b) in several respects, leading 0 ar
Journal articles with titles like "Insider Trading Charges Under bee•on 1348-Without the 'Technical Elements?'"" and "The Evolving
ystery of Illegal Insider Trading."9
.1 though these recent court decisions are sending shoe waves
rough the legal community, the provision's author, Senator
^e%, was not bashful about his intention to create a new se£urit^
aud crime that is easier to prove than § 10(b). In particular, en
ea y explained the new crime of securities fraud
as follows.
CollPoWe?Ty ^rwiok Couture is an Associate Professor at the University rt
W in Boise» where she teaches securities regulation an
crime
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o "the term 'false statement' does not imply a materiality
because the^r
^ Mfalse statement" and 'fraudulent
requiremen .
i
e,
there is no presumption that materialalternat V
stateme
because conviction can be premised on mere falsity.
ity is anieo48(2) does just this, allowing for conviction based on "false
^SdulMt P^nses, representations, or promises." Therefore
arguably, convfction under § 1348(2) does not require a showing of
mSection^l348

was not enacted in a vacuum, however. In fact, the
mirrors the text of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1344, which profits
bank fraud.17 The bank fraud statute, in turn, was modeled on the
mail and wire fraud statutes.18 Therefore, the caselaw construingthe
mail, wire, and bank fraud statutes should guide the interpretation ot
§ 1348.19 In Neder v. United States, the Supreme Court—albeh without
examining the grammar of the bank fraud statute in detai
e
the crimes of mail, wire, and bank fraud include the e emen o
materiality.20 Therefore, Congress, by later choosing to enact identical
language in § 1348,21 is presumed to have incorporated this settle in
terpretation of the statutory text.22 Moreover, the title ot § , ,
which was enacted by Congress as positive law2 and which she s
light on proper interpretation of the section's text24 labels the crime
"securities fraud," confirming that Congress intended to incorporate
the common law fraud element of materiality into the crime, r' ina y,
to the extent there were any ambiguity, the rule of lenity wou
avor
the narrower interpretation of this criminal statute, punishing on y
material" misrepresentations under § 1348.25
The next question is how materiality is defined under § 134 . n
«er, while holding that the mail, wire, and bank fraud statutes
incorporate the common law element of materiality, the oupreme
ourt quoted with approval two definitions of materiality. Furs , e
fourt quoted the following definition from United States v. Gaudin:
In general, a false statement is material if it has 'a natural tendency
\° !nfIuence, or [is] capable of influencing, the decision ot the
decisionmaking body to which it was addressed."26 Second, the Court
^ted the following Restatement (Second) of Torts definition of
materiality:
(a) [A] reasonable man would attach importance to its existence or
onexistence in determining his choice of action in the transaction in
question; or
(b
th ) the maker of the representation knows or has reason to know
inj t replplent regards or is likely to regard the matter as impor an
nm 6 ermining his choice of action, although a reasonable man wou
not so regard it.27
textof§1348

Slf

though a
equent

2013

few courts have adopted the Restatement definitioni in
mail and wire fraud cases, most courts apply the Gaudin
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«i oral theory" of insider trading applies to corporate insiders—
ydirectors and temporary insiders such as an un^hasoiBcersandd'rectors anaor
working for
the

the classical

derwnter

mm

^

^^^ g fiduciary

relationship with

r^Tny-s Shareholders, must either disclose the inside informatnor abstain from trading in the company's securities on the basis
,
r 37 c p con c i the "misappropriation theory" of insider trading i
impKcateif when' a person "misappropriates confidential information
for securities trading purposes, in breach of a duty owed to the^sourc

of the information."1' Under this theory, the

recipient and the source of the information gives rise to a duty on the
part of the recipient either to abstain from trading on the information
or to disclose his or her plans to trade to the source of the information^
Finally, a "tippee" of an insider or a misappropriator is subject^to
§10(b)'s insider trading prohibitions if the tipper breac es a
duty by disclosing the information to the tippee and i ^
PP
knows or has reason to know that the disclosure is a breac .
® ,
the tipper's disclosure constitutes a breach of fiduciary du y
p
on whether the tipper "personally will benefit, directly or in l
from his disclosure."41
.
Section 10(b) currently imposes liability under the classica J*
only if the inside information satisfies the investor-orien e o J ^
materiality standard that applies in misrepresentation
,
other words, under the classical theory, if a reasonable inves
.
,
not find the inside information to be significant in making a
ment decision, trading on the basis of that information oes n0
§ 10(b). The applicable definition of materiality under
e mi
priation theory is less settled, with several courts and com
musing that materiality should be linked to the source
information.43 Most courts and commentators, however, ap
.
same investor-oriented materiality standard in all insi e
44
contexts, including cases premised on the misappropna ion

2. Section 1348,s Subjective and/or
Materiality Standards

Source -Oriented

This author has identified three distinct theories of
i^Lj^one
liability under § 1348, each with its own materiality standair •
these theories applies the objective, investor-orien
under
f?*dard that is ordinarily applied in insider tradl"S '®®tentially
§ t0(b). As a consequence, the materiality standar 1 P
ower in § 1348 prosecutions than in prosecutions premi
hons of § 10(b).
First, conduct that would fall within the classical,
°n> or tipping theories under § 10(b)'s prohibition on
^2013 Thomson Reuters • Securities Regulation Law Journal • Spring 2013
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finest services fraud. For example, if an employee shares
^/^Information about his or her employer with a third party,
•1 tin of the employee's duties to the employer and in exchange
hire of the profits derived from trading, this is arguably akin to
forThe paid by the third party to the employee in order for the em53 The materiality standard that apWee to violate his or her duties.
Es in the context of honest services fraud is whether the recipient of
the duty of honest services—usually, the employer—would have
tended to change its conduct if the employee had disclosed his or her
secret dealings in violation of the duty.54 Therefore, like the intangible
property fraud discussed above, the materiality analysis for honest
services securities fraud is source-based, not investor-hased
The infamous squawk box case. United State-- v. Matuaffj " exemp ,
fiesdie potential for prosecution under ? 1348 for insider veo rg Jo
that case, the Government alleged that traders employed at eery era,
brokerage firms relayed internal::n an:at Imst.tot.oa
ve = v,r =
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dangers of setting the

hand, as the SuPJ'^ , DUblicity "60 This consideration weighs in favor
markets without 1PaUteriahty-both to lower the bar for squired
of a lower standard[ of mat^ai^y ^ statements. 0n the other hand,
disclosures and to deter a
^ dangers. When applied to omisan unduly low standard ca
t
dard might bring an overabundance
sions by a company, a minimal st^^Janagem%nt 'simply to bury
of information within it
>
information—a result that is
the shareholders in an avalanch
, „69 Moreover, when aphardly conducive to informed
materiality standard
plied to affirmative misrepresentations the
f SEC fil.
prevents "every miniscule inaccuracy in public^steteme
yolun.
ings" from being actionable, thus encouraging
P 70
tarily without fear of inadvertently incurring liability.
A subjective materiality standard disrupts this de^Cpf^P^maWng
Companies and management will logically think twice
mpn+ary
my voluntary disclosures, for fear than even innocuous
/~.nnPTess
:ould be characterized as "capable of influencing inves or •
.
las previously recognized the importance of voluntary isc
;he context of forward-looking statements by enacting a s a
.
71
larborfrom civil liability, with the goal of making more in
„72
ibout a company's future plans available to investors an
ep
'
fbe safe harbor does not apply in criminal cases, so orwa
statements are among the types of statements that rnay e
i consequence of this potentially lower materiality standar .
It is worth noting that one factor counteracts the
ntia y <•*
n g i m p a c t o f § 1 3 4 8 ' s l o w e r m a t e r i a l i t y s t a n d a r d : § 1 3 4 8 o n l y P P ._
® fraud in connection with the securities of reporting issue * ,
73
ng issuers are subject to an extensive mandatory repo ing
0 the potential chilling effect is lessened somewhat.
2. Chilling of Legitimate Uses of Information
In the insider trading context, the lower materiality stan ar
e reIated uncertainty about the applicable materia 1 y
u_
nf.y lnfribit legitimate uses of information, such as engagi g
es analysis or leading a company into
-enhancing
value

factions.
Section 1348's materiality standards may chill securities ana ys ^

ns interfering with the important function trecognized,
-nsunng market efficiency. As the Supreme Court kas
S
^ket efficiency is "significantly enhanced by [analysts ]
e
and analyze information, and thus th
e small
founds to the benefit of all investors."74 Anaiysts compile sma
*ces of information from a variety of sources in order to reachcon^iu
^ about the covered companies. As Professor
M. Nagy kas
flamed, "[B]oth courts and the SEC have acknowledged that
Donna

:
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, • 1Uv standard operates to make some misrepresentations
material y trading actionable criminally but not civilly (even if
9u
Sional civil elements of reliance and damages are met). As
tj? addition ^
iously argued in the context of mail and wire
lower

fraud3,"this upsets the ordinary relationship between criminal and
C1Iflriminal^liability

is ordinarily a subset of civil liability in instances
the relevant conduct injures identifiable individuals. Some civilly
actionable conduct is so wrongful that it is also acnme. If criminal
conduct involves a mens rea and an identifiable victim, the conduct is
usually also civilly actionable. This relationship between civil and crimi
nal liability is supported by the general rationale that cnmmal sanctions
are more severe than civil liability.84
where

This ordinary relationship between criminal and civil liability is
supported by two general theories: an economic theory and a mora
theory. Under economic theory, "criminal liability [which has a hig er
social cost than civil liability] is only optimal when the damages nec
essary to limit the offender's conduct to an optimal level are higher
than the actor could pay."85 Under moral theory, only that subset of
civilly actionable "conduct that is morally repugnant should be classi
fied as a crime."86
The extension of the scope of criminal liability under § 1348 beyond
the scope of civil liability under § 10(b) seems to turn this ordinary
understanding on its head, contrary to the leading theories about t e
civil-criminal divide. As this author has previously postulated,
however, there is one potential explanation for this inversion in t e
context of securities fraud, with potential support in the economic the
ory of the civil-criminal divide. Perhaps, in the unique context of secu
res fraud, the social cost of civil liability—with the disproportiona e
effect on the defendant company's stock value, the spillover effects on
he securities markets and the overall economy, and the immense
consumption of judicial resources—actually exceeds the social cos o
cnmmal liability, thus explaining why the relationship between civil
n criminal liability is inverted in the context of securities frau

C. Undue Prosecutorial Discretion
Section 1348, like other broad fraud statutes, affords the prosecuWjfL I?me*dous discretion in assessing what conduct to prosecu e.
bern }1S, discreti°n comes a danger that enforcement decisions will
mnh,a^ ase(* on improper considerations, such as bias or poi
9 Moreover, this broad discretion implicates separation of
PowJ
S
concern
so,mJ
s because, by in effect criminalizing everything
nding ln securities fraud
and leaving it to the prosecutors to decide
pr
secute
the PV ° ?
> Congress has delegated the law-making func I
executive branch.90 Although these concerns probably do not rise
2013
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